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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM: EQUAL PROTECTION
FOREWORD
As everyone is aware both within and without the legal pro-
fession, the United States Supreme Court has in recent years been
deeply concerned with the fairness and quality of the criminal jus-
tice system in this country. Through the vehicle of the 14th amend-
ment, the Court has rewritten the rules of criminal procedure in the
courts of fifty states.
For many years, constitutional analysis of criminal problems
concentrated on the concept of procedural due process-the neces-
sity of "fair trial," judged either by the standards of the Bill of Rights
or by the "immutable principles" of fundamental fairness. Recently,
however, in criminal matters as well as in other areas, the Supreme
Court has turned more and more of its attention to the second clause
of the 14th amendment, and has held an ever widening variety of
practices to be denials of "the equal protection of the laws." This
Symposium examines and analyzes the "equal protection" approach
as it has been or might be applied in several areas of our criminal
justice system. The consistent thread running through the notes
which follow is that equal protection may mean different things in
different areas of the law; in the criminal area it appears to be tem-
pered with the traditional notion of due process.
The first note, Full Protection of Fundamental Rights, takes
an historical approach to the matter, showing the growth and devel-
opment of the principle of equal protection in parallel with the due
process concept. The author notes with approval the abandonment
of the "state action" doctrine, but concludes that the Court has given
too short shrift to the nature of the right being protected, and thus
must refine its definition of equal protection in order to avoid plac-
ing too heavy a burden on the administration of criminal justice.
The second note, Right to Counsel, examines the development
in the past half-decade of the concept of equal protection in what is
perhaps the most fundamental due process right in the criminal
justice system. Due process alone cannot account for the decision in
Douglas v. California; and from that decision has sprung a multitude
of perplexing questions as to when and how counsel must be pro-
vided for the indigent. The author considers, in particular, the time
when counsel must be appointed and the misdemeanant's right to
appointed counsel. He concludes that much remains to be decided
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in the area, and that the rationale of equal protection may extend
far beyond that of due process.
If equal protection is required in the availability of counsel,
why is it not also required as to the great variety of resources which
may conceivably aid an accused in his defense, but which cost money
to obtain? Griffin v. Illinois indicated that the requirement did
exist in other areas besides the provision of counsel; and the ratio-
nale of that case has been considerably extended in the intervening
thirteen years. However, there remains vast unexplored territory.
The third note, Scope of the Right to Aid Other Than Counsel,
examines the distance that Griffin has come and explores the pos-
sibilities for the future. The author concludes that although progress
has been made in providing transcripts and avoiding filing fees,
there is still substantial inequality for the indigent, in particular
in the availability of expert witnesses and investigation. The burden
of providing these resources to the indigent need not, he suggests,
be heavy; since the resources provided need not be unlimited, but
need only be what the prudent man of reasonable means would
furnish for himself; and since provision of these resources will pro-
duce more efficiency and fairness at the trial level of the system.
In October of this year, an Ohio municipal court judge was
reported by the local press to have sharply criticized police depart-
ment practices in recommending pre-trial release. In particular, the
judge was reported to be upset with the release on their own recogni-
zance of persons accused of narcotics violations. The tenor of his
remarks as reported clearly indicated his concern over the seriousness
of the offenses and the necessity for strict treatment; but nowhere
in the report was there any indication of the judge's awareness of the
two questions which are the only ones relevant to consideration of
pre-trial release: (1) whether the accused can be relied upon to
appear at trial; and (2) whether there is a serious likelihood the
accused will commit crimes during the interval. Although an extreme
case, the reported attitude of the judge points up the general mis-
understanding of, or lack of attention to, considerations underlying
the bail system by courts, prosecutors, and perhaps defense attorneys
as well. The final note in this Symposium, The Bail System: Is It
Acceptable?, examines the application of equal protection principles
to the bail system, and finds it an area where distinctions based upon
the financial resources of an accused are rampant and have received
little judicial scrutiny. The author, after examining the results of
several bail projects, concludes that the money bail system as pres-
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ently constituted. in most jurisdictions is discriminatory and fre-
quently unnecessarily harsh; and that serious legislative and judicial
consideration should be given to its complete overhaul.
Problems of equal protection for all who appear before the bar
of criminal justice will continue to vex judge, prosecutor, defense
attorney, and scholar. Improvement in the protection of the indigent
accused must move forward apace; but at the same time the admin-
istration of criminal justice must continue with as little disruption
as possible. It is hoped that the papers in this Symposium, by ana-
lyzing the rationale of equal protection and suggesting directions in
which the law may move and should move, will be of some small
help in assuring that the judicial gloss on the phrase "equal protec-
tion of laws" will provide continually improving protection for the
individual accused and his society.
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